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This paper examines the effect of public assistance, labor market and marriage market 
conditions on the prevalence of single mother families across countries and over time. A 
multinomial logit derived from a random utility approach is estimated using individual-
level data for 14 countries. I find evidence that increases in the level of public support 
are significantly and positively associated with a higher incidence of both never married 
and divorced mothers. The results also suggest that single mothers are more prevalent 
when female wages are lower. Higher male earnings and employment opportunities in a 
woman’s marriage market appear to lead to fewer never married mothers, but more 
divorced mothers. Higher child support or alimony payments are associated with a 
higher prevalence of divorced mothers.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The prevalence of single mother families increased dramatically in the United States 
during the past four decades. The proportion of all families with children that were 
headed by a single mother rose from 8 percent in 1960 to 24 percent in 2002 (US 
Census Bureau). Similar trends have been observed in other Western nations, such as 
Britain or Sweden. However, other countries, such as Italy, Japan or Spain, have 
remained at low levels of female headship, with less than 5 percent of all families with 
children being headed by a single mother during the 1990s.     
Much research has been devoted to understanding the factors underlying this shift 
away from two-parent families in the United States. The main concern is that single 
motherhood seems to be associated with poverty and negative outcomes for children.
1 
In 2001, 42% of single-mother households in the US were poor, compared with 8% of 
households headed by married parents (US Census Bureau 2001).  
  The likelihood of a woman becoming a single mother is undoubtedly affected by 
social, cultural and religious factors. It is also undeniable, however, that there are 
economic variables with a potential to influence fertility and partnership decisions, as 
economic theory has long emphasized. Most studies hypothesize one of the following 
alternative explanations for the rise in single mother families in the US: 1. Welfare 
incentives (Murray 1984, Moffitt 1994, 1995, Hoynes 1997, Blau et al. 2004); 2. 
Increased economic opportunities for women (McLanahan 1994, Edlund 2005, Schmidt 
2003); 3. Reduced supply of marriageable men (Wilson 1987), or a combination of 
those (Rosenzweig 1999, Schultz 1994, Willis 1999, Moffitt 2001, Neal 2004).
2 None 
                                                 
1 See Lerman (1996), McLanahan & Sandefur (1994), and Krein & Beller (1988) for examples of studies 
that address the effect of living in a single mother household on children’s outcomes. 
2 See Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) for an explanation based on changes in social norms.   2
of these hypotheses alone is totally satisfactory, and no consensus has been reached on 
the subject to date. 
This paper examines whether the above-mentioned factors are significant in 
explaining the variation in the prevalence of single mothers across countries and over 
time. I combine individual-level data for 14 countries from the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) to examine the trends in single motherhood during the 1980s and 1990s. 
While previous studies of the prevalence of single mothers have focused on a single 
country, a multi-country analysis is especially attractive since the large variation in 
public support and labor market conditions across countries and over time provides an 
excellent source of identification for the effects of interest. Moreover, most previous 
studies either focused on overall rates of female headship, or addressed one part of the 
picture alone, mainly out-of-wedlock childbearing or marriage dissolution. I attempt to 
integrate these approaches by analyzing single motherhood as a whole while also taking 
into account the different routes that may lead to single motherhood. Finally, I estimate 
a structural model that stems directly from a random utility approach, as opposed to the 
common practice of estimating reduced form regressions, thus the results can be 
interpreted in terms of the underlying utilities, and allow for the simulation of different 
changes in benefit structures and labor market conditions. 
The results show that public support, labor market and marriage market conditions 
do seem to be significantly associated with the incidence of single mother families 
across countries, and the effects are largely consistent with the predictions of the model. 
The evidence suggests that increases in the level of public support for single mothers 
are significantly and positively associated with a higher prevalence of both never 
married and divorced mothers.  The results also show that single mothers are more 
prevalent when female wages are lower. Better marriage market conditions (higher male   3
earnings and employment rates) seem to be associated with a lower incidence of never 
married mothers, but the association is positive with the number of divorced mothers. 
Finally, higher child support payments are associated with a higher prevalence of 
divorced mothers.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. I first briefly review some 
relevant previous work (section 2). Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework and 
emphasizes the channels through which the explanatory variables affect the relevant 
decisions. The following section describes the data set and the overall trends in the 
prevalence of single mother families across countries. Section 5 presents and discusses 
the results, and section 6 summarizes the main findings and concludes. 
 
2. A Brief Look at the Literature 
Many previous studies have attempted to estimate the effect of welfare benefits on 
fertility and marriage in the United States, with mixed results.
3 These studies usually 
model the probability of being a female head as a function of individual and state 
characteristics, including welfare benefits. Most studies estimate cross-sectional 
regressions, which rely on interstate variation in benefits to identify the welfare effect 
(Schultz 1994). Some use more than one period and introduce state (or MSA) fixed-
effects in order to control for omitted state variables (Hoynes 1997, Moffitt 1994, Blau 
et al. 2004). Some find significant effects (Schultz 1994, Rosenzweig 1999), and some 
find no effect at all (Moffitt 1994, Hoynes 1997). 
The second set of variables that has been emphasized in the literature refers to 
economic independence of women, as measured by female wage levels and other 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Danziger et alia 1982, Murray 1984, Ellwood and Bane 1985, Hoffman and Duncan 
1988, Moffitt 1990, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2000, Fitzgerald 1991, Lundberg and Plotnick 1995, Jackson and 
Klerman 1996, Hoynes 1997, Lichter et al. 1997, Rosenzweig 1999, Blau et al. 2004, Neal 2004.   4
indicators of female attachment to the labor force and employment opportunities. Some 
have suggested that access to higher income possibilities would enable women to 
support children on their own (Schmidt 2003, McLanahan 1994, Edlund 2005).
4
 Others, 
however, point out that the lack of economic opportunities may lower the perceived 
costs of out-of-wedlock childbearing, especially for very young women (Rich and Kim 
2002, Duncan and Hoffman 1990).
5
 Wages could also show a negative correlation with 
the prevalence of single mothers if, as some have suggested, marriage is a normal good 
(Moffitt 2001, Oppenheimer 1994). 
Finally, some studies attribute the increase in the prevalence of single mothers in the 
US to a reduced supply of marriageable men, especially at the bottom of the skill 
distribution. In other words, sex ratios and the supply of men with stable earnings 
prospects have a potential to influence partnership decisions. Some evidence has been 
provided that the supply of men as well as their earnings and employment prospects 
affect female marriage behavior (Wilson 1987, Angrist 2002, Wallace 2000, Brien 
1997). Willis (1999) develops a theoretical framework that implies that out-of-wedlock 
childbearing should be more prevalent when females are in excess supply, and when the 
gains to marriage are small because male incomes are low. However, the fact that 
marriage market prospects affect marriage rates does not necessarily imply that they 
also affect single motherhood, as Neal (2004) points out.  
Few studies have addressed the relationship between the above-mentioned variables 
and the cross-country variation in the prevalence of single mothers, and those that have 
                                                 
4 For example, one of the testable implications of Schmidt's model is that "Higher female income, both in 
absolute terms as well as relative to that of men in a woman's marriage market, should increase the 
probability of a nonmarital birth" (Schmidt 2002). This hypothesis, however, is not confirmed by her 
empirical analysis. As for divorced single mothers, Sander (1985) concludes that "the divorce rate [in the 
US] is significantly and substantially affected by the earning ability of women in market worth". Lichter 
et al. (1997) briefly review a literature that “attribute(s) changing patterns in family formation to the 
improving employment circumstances of American women.” 
5 According to Rich and Kim (2002), "lack of economic opportunities may serve to lessen the perceived 
costs of engaging in early, nonmarital sexual activity". Duncan and Hoffman (1990) find that "women 
with the least to lose are most likely to have children during their teen years".   5
done so have taken a merely descriptive approach. This is due in part to difficulties in 
finding reliable, high quality, comparable data for different countries. 
Whiteford and Bradshaw (1994) and Bradshaw (1998) compare benefit systems in 
several countries, and their analysis hints at a possible association between the level of 
public support for single mother families and the prevalence of this type of household.
6
 
However, their cross-tabulations do not include significance levels, they do not account 
for any other factors that may vary across countries, and they only consider one period, 
thus not being able to introduce country fixed effects. 
 
3. A Model of Family Formation 
3.1 The Basic Model 
I propose a simple model that captures the relevant considerations in a minimal form. 
The model follows the spirit of the seminal work of Becker (Becker 1960, 1973, 1974, 
Becker et al. 1977, Becker and Barro 1988) in assuming that fertility and marriage 
decisions are the result of rational decision-making, in the sense that actions are 
influenced by the expected costs and benefits of the different choices available to the 
individual. 
I assume that a woman derives utility from her own consumption, leisure time, 
bearing children, and marriage. She faces a time constraint such that she needs to 
distribute her time between work, leisure, and childcare. She chooses marital status and 
number of children to maximize her utility, given her time and budget constraints. 
The fertility and partnership decisions are made jointly, so that, simplifying the 
fertility decision to a binary one, there are four possible outcomes: unmarried without 
                                                 
6 “The relationship between the structure of benefit systems facing lone parents and their individual 
behavior is clearly not straightforward. [Our evidence suggests that] most benefit systems are not neutral 
and can be expected to have the potential to affect incentives. Whether these incentives are translated into 
actual behavior is not at all clear, however.” (pp. 83-84, Whiteford and Bradshaw 1994).   6
children (j=1), unmarried with children (j=2), married without children (j=3), and 
married with children (j=4). However, there is an exogenous chance that a marriage will 
be hit by a negative shock and dissolved. Therefore, once we account for the possibility 
of divorce (or widowhood), there are six possible outcomes (see figure 1).
7 
A woman i in country s and period t is thus faced with this (static) utility 
maximization problem. The (expected) maximal utility that she can achieve by choosing 
alternative  j  is denoted by
 
j
ist U .  There are thus two distinct routes into single 
motherhood. A woman can become a single mother if the maximal level of utility that 
she can achieve by choosing the unmarried with children option exceeds expected utility 
in all the other possible states. Alternatively, a woman can become a divorced mother if 
she chooses to get married and have children, but then gets divorced. 
The utility function, before making any assumptions about functional form, can be 
expressed as: 
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Where  c is the consumption level, l stands for leisure, k indicates the presence of 
children, and m stands for marriage
8. Included in x are relevant characteristics of the 
woman, such as her age and education level. Finally, the ε´s incorporate the 
heterogeneity across women in their taste for marriage and children. 
  The woman’s consumption is determined by the level of income in the household, 
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7 In fact marriage dissolution can take place through separation, divorce or widowhood. I will refer to 
“divorce” in general for simplicity.  
8 In practice, cohabiting couples will also be included as married.   7
Income is composed of the woman’s labor earnings (wh), the benefits received by all 
members of the household (B), and her partner's income (I). The wage rate is assumed 
not to vary with j, while benefits are set at the country level and vary with family 
composition. The partner’s income is zero if the woman remains single, and it includes 
child support or alimony payments if she’s divorced. 
There is a time constraint, so that she needs to distribute her time between work, 






ist t l h T + + = ), and children require a minimum amount of 
time that must be provided by the mother (t>0 if k>0). She chooses marital status and 
fertility to maximize her utility, given the time and budget constraints.  
The probability that a woman i in country s and period t is a never married mother 
can thus be expressed as follows: 
(3)  ) 2 , (
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If the woman chooses to get married and have children, then there is a certain 
probability ( st µ ) that the marriage will fail. Thus, the probability that a woman ends up 
divorced with children is: 
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The overall probability that a woman i in country s and period t is a single mother 
equals the sum of the two components just described: 
(5) ) 4 , ( ) 2 , (
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Note that although there is a direct choice to have children while unmarried, the woman 
does not choose divorce directly; she just chooses to get married and have children, in 
the awareness that the marriage will be dissolved with a certain probability, which may 
vary by country and over time.    8
This simple model, under some weak assumptions about the functional form of the 
utilities, provides some predictions regarding the effect of the variables of interest on 
the incidence of single mothers. The first one is the level of public assistance. The 
higher the benefits available in any given state, e.g. never married mother with children, 
the higher the probability that a woman will choose that option.
9 Both the absolute level 
of support and the eligibility rules (i.e. the level of support relative to other family 
types) are potentially relevant.  
The model doesn’t provide a clear prediction for the effect of the female wage level 
on the prevalence of single mothers. On the one hand, by raising her income, high 
wages would make it easier for a woman to live without a partner, lowering the gains 
from marriage through an income effect. Thus better economic opportunities could 
increase the probability of becoming a single mother. However, by raising the 
opportunity cost of a birth (in terms of foregone earnings, since children require time 
from the mother), high wages could discourage women from having children 
(substitution effect). Thus, from a theoretical point of view, the sign of the effect of 
female wages on the prevalence of single mothers is ambiguous.
10  
Finally, as mentioned, some studies attribute the increase in the prevalence of single 
mothers in the US to a reduced supply of marriageable men. Male employment and 
earnings enter the model through the woman’s budget constraint. Higher male earnings 
and better male employment prospects make marriage more attractive for women.
11 
Encouraging marriage may have a negative effect on the likelihood of choosing to be an 
unmarried mother. Higher male earnings would imply higher earnings in the household 
if the woman stays married, but also if she gets divorced (through alimony payments). 
                                                 
9 More specifically, under the assumption that U
j is (weakly) increasing in B
j,  0 / ≥ ∂ ∂
j j B P . 
10 The sign of this relationship will depend on the functional form of the utilities, and on expected hours 
of work across the different states. 
11 If utility is (weakly) increasing in partner’s earnings (I), then  0 / ≥ ∂ ∂
j j I P . Increases in male 
earnings increase I only in the married states (j=3 and j=4), since I=0 for single women.   9
Thus higher male earnings make the married states more attractive, automatically 
increasing the number that end up in divorce.
12 
  This model is of course extremely simplistic and it ignores important aspects such as 
the possibility of marriage for unmarried mothers and remarriage for divorced mothers, 
or the direct determinants of the divorce decision. However, the design was dictated 
largely by the cross-sectional nature of the available data. It is obviously not intended to 
provide an entirely realistic description of the way women make the fertility and 
marriage decisions, but rather to offer a framework that allows for an economic 
interpretation of the estimated parameters.  
 
3.2 Implementation 
In order to estimate the model, some assumptions need to be made about the functional 
form of the utilities, and about the distribution of the residuals. I assume a linear 
individual utility function, so that eq. (1) becomes: 
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Where, again, c is the consumption level, l stands for leisure, k indicates the presence of 
children,  m stands for marriage, and the interaction term  k m⋅   accounts for the 
possibility that women value children within marriage above and beyond the separate 
preferences for marriage and children. We expect the coefficients for consumption, 
leisure, marriage and children to be positive. Included in x are relevant individual 
characteristics of the woman, such as her age and education level.  
  The only complication derives from the fact that there is uncertainty regarding 
whether a marriage will be dissolved. Expected utility in the married states (j=3 and 
j=4) is thus a weighted average of the married and the divorced states. Letting d denote 
                                                 
12 For a given divorce probability.   10
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  Leisure time is unobservable, so in practice it is taken to vary with country (s), year 
(t), state (j), and observable characteristics (x). Thus the difference in leisure time across 
individuals and states will be captured by dummies that vary with country, year and 
state (possibly reflecting differences in childcare availability and informal childcare 
practices across countries), plus the x’s.  
  Total income is adjusted by composition of the household through a fairly standard 
equivalence scale: (1+ 0.5 number of additional adults + 0.3 number of children).
13 The 
coefficient for consumption is allowed to vary with the source of income. 
Under the additional assumption that the 
j
ist ε  are distributed i.i.d. extreme value, we 
can estimate the probabilities 
j
ist P  with a multinomial (conditional) Logit. The 
probability that a woman i from country s in period t is a never married mother then 
equals: 
(8)   ∑
+ Γ + + + + + +
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st ς  stands for the set of dummies that vary with country, year and state,
14 and 
where the income variables have been adjusted by the composition of the household. 
  As for the probability that a woman is divorced with children, 
 
                                                 
13 Alternative adjustment scales are also explored. 
14 Their exact definition is specified in section 5. 
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Where consumption in the numerator has not been disaggregated into its three 
components for presentational simplicity. 
  The overall incidence of single mothers in a given country and period would just 
equal the sum of the incidence of never married and divorced mothers. The derivatives 
of this incidence with respect to the variables of interest can easily be calculated. If the 
coefficients on income (the s ´ β ) are positive, the predicted effects are summarized in 
table 1. Increases in benefits for never married mothers are expected to increase the 
incidence of this type of households, and similarly, higher benefits for divorced mother 
are expected to lead to more families headed by a divorced mother. The effect of 
increasing benefits for all single mother families, however, would be positive on the 
incidence of never married mothers, but ambiguous for divorced mothers (and a 
function of the probability of divorce). 
  The predicted effect of female wages is ambiguous and depends on how hours of 
work vary across alternative states. Higher male earnings and employment rates are 
expected to reduce the incidence of never married mothers, while increasing the 
attractiveness of marriage, thus leading to a higher number of divorces. 
 
4.  Data and Descriptive Evidence 
4.1 The Luxembourg Income Study 
The Luxembourg Income Study database is a collection of household income surveys 
that includes 29 countries, with (cross-sectional) datasets that span up to three decades,   12
organized in 5 waves, although not all countries have data sets for each of the waves.
15 
The advantage of this data source is that demographic and income variables are made 
easily comparable across data sets, which makes country comparisons feasible. The 
main disadvantage is that the data are not longitudinal and no information is provided 
about the timing of marriage and divorce. The nature of the data constrains considerably 
the type of model that we can estimate. 
I keep all countries with at least two years of data available and sufficient 
information on marital status and earnings. I end up using LIS data sets for 14 
countries,
16 for five "waves" that correspond to the years 1984-87, 1988-91, 1992-95, 
1996-99 and 2000-01. The five periods are available for just 2 countries, while only two 
waves are available for one country. The remaining 11 countries have 3 or 4 waves 
available. There are 50 country-year observations.
17  
The population of interest includes all women aged 18 to 55. The sample size is 
383,397 observations. Most specifications will however focus on women aged 18 to 45, 
whose family formation decisions are more likely to be affected by current labor market 
conditions and benefit levels. The sample size for this younger population is 295,275. 
 
4.2 The Incidence of Single Mothers 
Never married mothers are defined as never married women who live by themselves 
with their children younger than 18. Divorced mothers are defined as divorced, 
separated or widowed women who live by themselves with their children younger than 
18. Cohabiting mothers are counted as married.  
                                                 
15 Information on the LIS database is available online at www.lisproject.org. 
16 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
17 See table A.1 in the appendix for a list of the years used for each country.   13
Figure 2 shows the number of single (never married or divorced) mothers in each of 
the 14 countries, as a proportion of all women aged 18 to 55, by year. In the late 1990’s, 
the United Kingdom and the United States experienced the highest incidence of single 
mothers (between 7 and 9 percent of all women). The lowest incidence was observed in 
Italy and Hungary, with less than 2 percent. The evolution of the prevalence of single 
mother households over time was also quite different across the 14 countries. Israel, 
Germany, Ireland or Canada experience substantial increases during the 1980’s and 
1990’s, while a considerable decline was observed in Hungary or The Netherlands. 
We would like to understand how much of the cross-country variation in the 
incidence of single mothers, as well as its change over time, can be attributed to 
differences in the number of never married versus divorced mothers. Figure 3 displays 
the proportion of never married and divorced mothers separately, by country, in 
(approx.) 1993. Divorced mothers were more numerous than never married mothers in 
all countries but Ireland. However, the number of never mothers increased during the 
two decades in all countries but Hungary, while the number of divorced mothers 
experienced a slower growth, and it actually fell in five countries. On average, during 
the 1980’s and 1990’s the number of never married mothers more than doubled, while 
there was a 19 percent increase in the incidence of divorced mothers. 
Thus, there is substantial variation across countries in the overall incidence of single 
mothers, as well as by marital status. The evolution over time also differs considerably. 
Divorced mothers were more frequent in practically all countries in the early 1990’s, but 
the number of never married mothers increased much more rapidly between 1980 and 
2000. In 1992-95, the cross-country correlation between the proportion of divorced and 
never married mothers was .67. The correlation between the changes in both 
components over time across countries is .49.   14
Both components contribute to the cross-country variation in the prevalence of 
single mothers. The correlation between the overall incidence and the number of never 
married mothers in 1992-95 was .89, while the correlation with the number of divorced 
mothers was .93. An alternative measure of how much of the overall variation in the 
prevalence of single mothers can be attributed to each group is the covariance between 
the overall prevalence and each component, divided by the variance in the overall 
prevalence of single mothers. The advantage of this measure over the raw correlations is 
that it accounts for the magnitude of the contribution of each component to the overall 
variance in the prevalence of single mothers, as well as for the closeness of fit. 
According to this measure, the prevalence of divorced mothers contributes 57 percent to 
the overall variance, while the prevalence of never married mothers accounts for the 
remaining 43 percent of the variance in the overall prevalence of single mothers.  
  When analyzing the changes over time, the results are similar. The changes in the 
incidence of divorced mothers contribute 65 percent to the variance in the change of the 
total number of single mothers, while changes in never married mothers account for the 
remaining 35 percent.  
  Therefore, it appears that the variation in the prevalence of single mothers, both 
across countries and over time, can be attributed to differences in both out-of-wedlock 
fertility and divorce. Moreover, the incidence of never married and divorced mothers 
follow different paths across countries and over time, which points to the usefulness of a 
model that examines their determinants separately, versus the usual approach of 
lumping both groups of women into a single “female heads” category. 
 
 
   15
5. Estimation Results 
5.1   Variables and Summary Statistics 
The model is estimated using individual-level data for 14 countries in 5 periods (there 
are 50 country-period observations). The sample includes all women aged 18 to 45. The 
variables of interest are benefit levels, female wages, and male variables (earnings and 
employment levels, as well as child support payments). The following conditional logit 
model (as introduced in section 3) for the determinants of single motherhood for person 
i, in country s and period t is estimated: 
(10)  ∑
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A woman is thus assumed to choose marital status and fertility in order to maximize her 
utility, using her expectations about her own wage, hours of work, benefits, and 
husband’s earnings. 
Expected hourly wage for women in a given country and period is calculated as the 
average wage of all employed women, by age and education (see appendix for details 
on the LIS variables used). In order to address selection issues derived from low 
employment rates in certain subpopulations, an alternative measure of expected wage is 
calculated using only unmarried women without children. Hours of work are calculated 
as the average number of hours that women work per year (in country s and period t). 
Hours are allowed to vary with j since we assumed that children require time from the 
mother. On average, mothers work fewer hours than non-mothers in all countries.
18 
Table 2 shows average hourly wage for women aged 18 to 45 with a high school degree 
                                                 
18 On average, women without children aged 18 to 55 work 1,061 hours a year, versus 838 hours for 
women with children.    16
and no university education by country, in period 3 (1992-95). The lowest wages were 
paid in Hungary, while female hourly wage is highest in Luxembourg and Germany. 
Expected benefits are also a function of household composition, and reflect the 
changing benefit schedules at the country level. Thus benefits are calculated as the 
average received by each household type in a given country and period. I include 
family-related benefits, such as child and family allowances or single parent benefits, 
and social assistance, including means-tested transfers and near-cash benefits like food 
stamps or childcare subsidies (see appendix). Table 2 shows average benefit levels 
received by single mother families by country in 1992-95. Benefits were very low in 
Italy, while they were highest in The Netherlands and the UK. 
Expected husband’s earnings are calculated as average earnings for employed men, 
times the male employment rate. They are allowed to vary with age and education level, 
since marriage market conditions may vary by cohort and with education. Table 2 
shows average earnings for employed men with a high school degree and no college and 
ages between 20 and 47, by country, in 1992-95. Male earnings are very low in 
Hungary, while the highest levels correspond to Canada and Luxembourg.  
Child support payments are calculated as average payments received by divorced 
women in a given country and period. They are allowed to vary with children and 
education level. 
Age and education level are included in the model separately since they may affect a 
woman’s preferences for marital status and children directly. I define three education 
levels, which correspond approximately to less than a high school degree, high school 
graduates, and college graduates (see appendix for details). Age is included as a dummy 
for women aged 30 or younger. The coefficients on age and education are allowed to 
vary with j.    17
Finally, a set of dummies for country and period, interacted with j, are included. 
Three different sets of dummies are used in alternative specifications: country dummies 
and period dummies, country dummies and time trends, and country dummies interacted 
with time trends. Thus in practice we are controlling for unobservable factors that may 
affect family formation and that are fixed at the country level or changing at the same 
pace in all countries. In the specifications with country-specific time trends, we are also 
allowing for unobserved time-varying factors at the country level. 
All monetary variables are normalized using Purchasing Power Parities.
19 They are 
also adjusted by household composition. Table 3 shows some descriptive statistics for 
the sample of women aged 18 to 45. About 50 percent are ever married with children, 
while only 2.35 percent are never married with children. Almost 52 percent of the 
women in the sample have a high school degree (but no college), while 22 percent have 
a university education. About 43 percent are 30 years old or younger. Average female 
wage is 9 dollars an hour, and women work on average 1,059 hours a year. Average 
male earnings are 24,000 dollars a year, and their average employment rate is 80 
percent. Divorced women with children receive on average 1,737 dollars a year in child 
support and/or alimony payments. Average benefits received by a household amount to 
almost 1,600 dollars a year. 
 
5.2   Results 
Table 4 presents the coefficients from several specifications of the conditional logit 
model. The estimated coefficients for female wages, benefits and husband’s earnings 
are positive (as expected, since individuals are assumed to derive utility from 
consumption) and significant in most specifications, except for benefits. The 
                                                 
19 Provided by the OECD, in current US dollars.   18
coefficients on marriage and children
20 indicate that the least preferred family status is 
never married motherhood, while the most preferred states seem to be single without 
children and married with children (not significantly different from each other). Higher 
educational attainment is significantly associated with a lower likelihood of having 
children (both single and married). Younger women are more likely to be single and 
childless, and as they age they become more likely to be never married mothers, married 
without children, and married with children, successively. Finally, most of the country 
and time dummies are significant. Recall that these dummies are in practice controlling 
for unobserved variables at the country level that may affect marital status and fertility, 
and that these country effects are allowed to vary over time in the specifications where 
the country dummies are interacted with the time trends.  
Table 5 displays the marginal effects associated with changes in each of the 
explanatory variables. They are calculated as the average of the derivatives at the value 
of the explanatory variables for each observation, and the standard errors are calculated 
using the delta method. Increases in the level of benefits that single mother families 
receive seem to be significantly associated with a higher prevalence of both never 
married and divorced mothers. A 10 percent increase in benefits for single mother 
families (leaving benefits for all other households unchanged) would result in a 5 
percent increase in the incidence of single mothers (note that the average incidence of 
single mothers is 6.6 percent of all women 18 to 45). 
A potential problem with this result is raised by concerns about the exogeneity of 
benefit levels. If increases in the prevalence of single mothers in a given country trigger 
increases in public assistance for this family type, this would generate positive 
estimated effects despite the reverse causality. However, I found no evidence that this 
                                                 
20 Not shown in the table.   19
was the case in any of the countries under consideration. If anything, the countries that 
experienced large increases in the prevalence of single mothers tended to implement 
reforms that reduced the benefits available to these families, reforms motivated by 
concerns that high benefit levels were encouraging single motherhood. Note that if this 
is the case, then the results that I report might be underestimating the true effects of 
benefits. 
Higher male earnings and male employment rates appear to lead to significant 
declines in the incidence of never married mothers, while increasing the number of 
divorced mothers significantly. A 10 percent increase in male earnings would result in a 
5.8 percent decrease in the number of never married mothers, while increasing the 
incidence of divorced mothers by about 3.4 percent. The overall effect on the 
prevalence of single mothers is negative but small and not significant. Higher child 
support payments are significantly associated with more divorced mothers, although the 
effect is small (and with fewer never married ones, although the overall effect is 
significantly positive).   
Finally, higher female hourly wages seem to be associated with a significantly lower 
prevalence of never married mothers. The estimated effect is also negative (but only 
marginally significant) for divorced mothers. Thus it appears that the substitution effect 
through reduced hours of work associated with motherhood would dominate the income 
effect. A 10 percent increase in female hourly wages is estimated to result in a 3.4 
percent decline in the incidence of single mothers. 
Note, however, that there is no single effect of marriage market and labor market 
conditions on the prevalence of single mothers. The effect of male earnings and 
employment rates, for instance, varies for never married versus divorced mothers, but it 
is also heterogeneous across marriage markets, and even within marriage markets,   20
depending on the relative position of individual women. The heterogeneity across 
marriage markets can be highlighted by looking at the distribution of the marginal 
effects across women in different marriage markets. For never married motherhood, the 
average effect of male earnings is -.061 (see table 4). However, the median effect is -
.053, with the 10
th percentile at -.111 and the 90
th at -.007. As for the effect on the 
incidence of divorced mothers, an average effect of .058 is actually distributed with a 
10
th percentile at .026 and a 90
th percentile of .107. 
Also informative is the distribution of the marginal effects of female wage levels on 
the incidence of single mothers. While the average derivative is significantly negative at 
-.244, the effects vary across women, with a 10
th percentile at -.498 and a 90
th percentile 
that is in fact positive, at .029.   
The structural nature of the model allows for simulations of different scenarios. We 
can for instance analyze the predicted effects of different changes in the benefits 
schedules. It may be interesting to compare the effects of increases in benefits that are 
targeted to single mother families, versus increases in universal family benefits, 
common in some European countries. The results indicate that increasing benefits for all 
families with children (including both single and married mothers) would still result in 
significant increases in the number of single mothers (see table 4). The increase in never 
married mothers would be smaller than in the case of targeted benefits, but the 
incidence of divorced mothers would rise even more than with targeted benefits (since 
both the married and the divorced states are made more attractive, thus leading to large 
increases in marriage with children, and consequently more divorces). 
We can also simulate different scenarios by country. For instance, in the US never 
married mothers received on average $3,780 in public assistance in 2000. The model 
predicts that, were benefits for never married mothers cut by a half, the incidence of   21
these households would fall by 3.3 percent. If, instead, male earnings were to increase 
by 50%, the number of never married mothers would fall by 2.2 percent. 
The results can help us understand some of the trends observed in the data. As can 
be seen in figure 2 (and as described in section 4.2), Hungary and The Netherlands 
experienced the most significant declines in the incidence of single mothers, while large 
increases took place in Canada, Ireland, the UK and Germany. As it turns out, both 
Hungary and The Netherlands suffered nominal cuts in benefit levels for single mother 
families during the period. In fact, average benefits received by Dutch single mothers 
fell by 17% in nominal terms during the 1990’s (from 7,900 in 1991 to 6,600 in 1999, in 
current US$). At the same time, Canada, the UK and Germany experienced substantial 
increases in public assistance for single mother families. The average single mother in 
the UK received $7,800 in 1991, compared with $11,500 in 1999.  
 
5.3   Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks 
The results seem robust to a number of different specifications and robustness checks. 
Alternative specifications are estimated using different age cuts for the sample of 
women. When including women 18 to 55, the signs of the coefficients and average 
derivatives remain unchanged, but they become less significant. The results are also 
robust to different adjustments for household composition. 
As a robustness check, I estimate the same set of regressions with a different scaling 
for monetary variables. Instead of Purchasing Power Parities, I normalize earnings and 
benefits using per capita income in a given country and period. The results are quite 
similar.   22
The baseline regressions are re-estimated imposing a common coefficient for all the 
components of consumption, with no significant changes in the main results. 
Specifications are also run with period dummies instead of time trends. 
In order to ascertain how much the results are being driven by the US, I estimate the 
model excluding the US data. It turns out that, although the signs of the effects remain 
unchanged, the sizes of the coefficients for the income variables and their significance 
levels are increased. In particular, the coefficient for benefit levels is now always 
significant, while it was not in the specifications that included the US (see table 4).  
  Objections could be posed to the use of a multinomial logit for estimation of the 
model. Although many have noted that fertility and marriage decisions are made 
jointly,
21 a nested structure may seem more appealing. We could think of the decision 
process as that of choosing whether to get married or not, and then making the fertility 
decision within the chosen marital status. This approach would relax the assumption of 
independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) implicit in the multinomial logit model. 
Thus I estimate nested logit models with two alternative nesting structures in order to 
compare the results with the baseline multinomial model.
22 The signs of the coefficients 
are unchanged and the magnitudes and significance levels are similar. The main results 
for the income variables seem robust to the nesting structure. 
  Finally, I estimate the model including only observations for women with no college 
education. As expected, the estimated effects of public assistance are larger and more 
significant than for the full sample. The coefficients for female wage and marriage 
market conditions also appear to increase slightly in magnitude. 
 
                                                 
21 See Montgomery and Trussell 1986. 
22 The first nesting structure has one branch for single and one for married states, while the second 
structure has one branch for childless states and one for states with children.   23
6. Summary and Conclusions 
The goal of this paper was to exploit the variation across countries and over time to 
shed light on the determinants of the incidence of single motherhood. The results 
suggest that benefit systems, labor market and marriage market conditions do influence 
marriage and fertility decisions, and thus the likelihood that a woman is a single mother 
in a given country and period. 
With individual-level data for 14 countries for the 1980’s and 1990’s, I examine the 
effect of three groups of economic variables on the prevalence of single mothers. These 
include the level of public support, female wage levels, and marriage market conditions 
as measured by male earnings and employment levels. Although these factors can 
account for only part of the cross-country variation, they do appear to be significantly 
associated with the incidence of single mothers, and the effects are largely consistent 
with the predictions of the model. 
The results indicate that a 10% increase in (yearly) benefits for single mothers, 
leaving benefits unchanged for other families, would increase the prevalence of single 
mothers by about 5 percent. A 10% increase in female hourly wage would lower the 
average prevalence of single mothers by 3 percent. A higher prevalence of never 
married mothers is also associated with lower male earnings and employment rates in a 
woman’s marriage market. A 10% increase in average male yearly earnings would 
decrease the prevalence of never married mothers by 6 percent, on average, while the 
effect on the prevalence of divorced mothers is positive and significant. The overall 
effect of male earnings and employment levels on the incidence of single mothers is 
negative but insignificant. Finally, increases in child support or alimony payments are 
associated with a higher prevalence of divorced mothers, although the estimated effects 
are very small.   24
The results thus suggest that never married and divorced mothers are influenced 
differently by economic variables. Never married mothers appear to be more frequent in 
environments where female wages are low, marriage market conditions are poor (male 
earnings and employment rates are low), and social assistance generous and targeted. As 
for divorced mothers, their incidence seems higher in settings where male earnings and 
employment rates are high, public support for families with children is more generous, 
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Data Appendix 
 
The analysis includes data for 14 countries and 5 periods. Periods were chosen for each 
country so that the data always come from the same national survey.
23 Table A.1 lists all 
countries and periods.  
 
1. Education 
Two education dummies are used in the analysis. They denote the highest educational 
level attained by an individual. One of the dummies indicates “upper secondary 
education and post-secondary non-tertiary education”, and a second dummy designates 
“tertiary education”. In order to make these variables as comparable as possible across 
countries, I have followed the indications provided by LIS (see 
http://www.lisproject.org/dataccess/educlevel/educdefcountry.htm). To guarantee a 
sufficient level of international comparability, the proposed recoding follows the 
education classification of UNESCO, the ISCED-97. 
 
2. Wages and Earnings 
The following variables are used to calculate female hourly wage: 
 
PNWAGE: Net wage and salary income. 
PGWAGE: Gross wage and salary income. 
PYTAX: Income taxes. 
PMEEC: Mandatory employee contributions. 
PHOURS: Number of hours worked per week. 
PWEEKFT: Number of weeks worked/year full time. 
PWEEKPT: Number of weeks worked/year part time. 
 
When all variables were available, hourly wage was calculated as: 
PNWAGE/(PHOURS*(PWEEKFT+PWEEKPT)) 
 
When net wage was not available, I used gross wage minus income taxes and employee 
contributions. When hours worked per week were not available, I used 40 hours for full-
time weeks and 20 hours for part-time weeks. When number of weeks worked was not 
available, I used 48 to 50 weeks, depending on guaranteed vacation time by country. 
The definition was kept unchanged in all periods for each country. 
 
Average wage is calculated by education level (three different levels, see above) and by 
age group (18 to 30, 31 to 45, 46 to 55). 
 
Male earnings are calculated as net wages when available, or gross wage minus income 
taxes and employee contributions. They are also estimated by education level and age 
group, although the age groups are slightly modified given that women tend to marry 
slightly older men (the age groups are 20 to 32, 33 to 47, and 48 to 57). 
 
3. Employment and Hours 
Male employment rates are calculated by education and age groups, and a man is 
classified as employed if he reports positive earnings, as defined above. 
                                                 
23 Except for the UK: the data for 1991 and 1995 come from the Family Expenditure Survey, while the 
data for 1999 are from the Family Resources Survey.   29
 
Female hours of work are calculated as average hours worked a year by women of a 
given family status, country and year. Hours worked per year were calculated as hours 
worked per week, times weeks worked per year (full time or part time). When hours 
worked per week were not available, I used 40 hours for full-time weeks and 20 hours 
for part-time weeks. When number of weeks worked was not available, I used 48 to 50 
weeks, depending guaranteed vacation time by country. The definition was kept 
unchanged in all periods for each country. 
 
4. Benefits 
Benefits are calculated as average transfers received by a type of household (unmarried, 
married or divorced women, with or without children) during the year, by country and 
period. Benefits include social assistance (including means-tested benefits and near-cash 
benefits, such as food stamps or child care subsidies) and family-related benefits 
(including family and child allowances and single-parent benefits). The LIS variables 
used are V20, V22, V24, V25 and V26. 
 
5. Child support 
Child support (and/or alimony payments) received by divorced women with children are 
calculated using the LIS variable V34 (“Alimony and child support”) and, for coutries 
where this one was not available, V35 (“Other regular private income”). 
 
 
Table A.1. LIS Datasets Used 
   1984-87 1988-91 1992-95 1996-99 2000-01 
Australia  1985  1989  1994       
Austria        1994  1997    
Belgium  1985  1988  1992  1997    
Canada  1987  1991  1994  1997    
Finland  1987     1995     2000 
Germany  1984  1989  1994     2000 
Hungary     1991  1994  1999    
Ireland        1994  1996  2000 
Israel  1986     1992  1997  2001 
Italy     1991  1995  1998  2000 
Luxembourg  1985  1991  1994  1997  2000 
Netherlands     1991  1994  1999    
United Kingdom     1991  1995  1999    




   30
 
























Note: LIS data, 14 countries included. Household weights have been used. Single mothers are 
defined as women aged between 18 and 55, living by themselves with their own children under 
































Not married, no children 
Not married with children  
Married, no children 
Married with children 
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Note: LIS data, 14 countries included. Household weights have been used. Never married 
mothers are defined as never married women aged between 18 and 55, living by themselves 
with their own children under the age of 18. Divorced mothers are defined as divorced, 
separated or widowed women aged between 18 and 55, living by themselves with their own 








Table 1. Summary of Predicted Effects on the Prevalence of Single Mothers 
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Table 2. Average female wages, public transfers to single mothers, and male earnings, 










Australia  8.46 6,438  19,082 
Austria  6.70 5,112  17,496 
Belgium  6.40 3,293  15,229 
Canada  9.95 5,963  25,225 
Finland  5.64 5,820  11,411 
Germany  10.89 3,012  18,818 
Hungary  2.38 1,666  6,088 
Ireland  6.49 6,673  16,140 
Israel  5.87 1,955  18,790 
Italy  7.26 74  15,411 
Luxembourg  10.69 4,597  25,601 
Netherlands  10.33 9,561  21,825 
United Kingdom  9.54 8,751  20,595 
United States  8.43 3,549  23,539 
 
Note: LIS data, amounts expressed in current PPP US $, period 3 (1992-95). “Average female 
wage” is calculated for women aged 18 to 45, with a high school degree but no university 
education. “Average male earnings” are calculated for men aged 20 to 47, with a high school 














Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Never married w/o 
children (j=1)  0.2636 0.2084 0 1 
Never married 
with children (j=2)  0.0235 0.0234 0 1 
Ever married w/o 
children (j=3)  0.2138 0.0723 0 1 
Ever married with 
children (j=4)  0.4990 0.2013 0 1 
High school 
diploma 0.5186 0.4997 0 1 
College 0.2162 0.4116 0 1 
Young (<30)  0.4317 0.4953 0 1 
Female wage  8.9576 3.2353 1.5324 18.6287 
Female wage (2)  9.0928 3.4212 0.9512 18.8116 
Male earnings  23999 11394 3209 63731 
Male employment  0.8026 0.1187 0.3208 0.9823 
Child support  1737 938 263 4678 
Divorce 0.1406 0.0455 0.0608 0.2169 
Fem. Hours 
worked 1059 218 105 1430 
Benefits 1595 1347 0 11621 
 
Note: The sample consists of all women 18 to 45 years old. The data are pooled for all 14 
















Table 4. Conditional Logit Results for the Incidence of Single Mothers 
    1     2    3    4    
Female  earnings  0.024  *** 0.018 *** 0.026 *** 0.021 *** 
  (0.0046)   (0.0055)  (0.0044)  (0.0051)  
Benefits  0.005  . 0.028 . 0.006 . 0.030 . 
  (0.0131)   (0.0224)  (0.0131)  (0.0225)  
Male  earnings  0.004 .  0.005 ** 0.004  .  0.006 ** 
  (0.0025)   (0.0026)  (0.0025)  (0.0026)  
High school, j=2  -0.654  ***  -0.669 *** -0.652 *** -0.666 *** 
  (0.0296)   (0.0298)  (0.0296)  (0.0297)  
High school, j=3  -0.062  ***  -0.060 *** -0.064 *** -0.061 *** 
  (0.0156)   (0.0158)  (0.0156)  (0.0158)  
High school, j=4  -0.164  ***  -0.170 *** -0.162 *** -0.169 *** 
  (0.0135)   (0.0139)  (0.0135)  (0.0138)  
University, j=2  -1.475  ***  -1.497 *** -1.467 *** -1.487 *** 
  (0.0480)   (0.0488)  (0.0478)  (0.0484)  
University,  j=3  0.044  * 0.018 . 0.041 . 0.014 . 
  (0.0261)   (0.0272)  (0.0261)  (0.0272)  
University, j=4  -0.274  ***  -0.296 *** -0.271 *** -0.290 *** 
  (0.0227)   (0.0250)  (0.0224)  (0.0243)  
Age,  j=2  1.080  *** 1.072 *** 1.094 *** 1.085 *** 
  (0.0268)   (0.0272)  (0.0272)  (0.0276)  
Age,  j=3  1.800  *** 1.795 *** 1.800 *** 1.794 *** 
  (0.0172)   (0.0178)  (0.0172)  (0.0178)  
Age,  j=4  2.558  *** 2.549 *** 2.569 *** 2.559 *** 
  (0.0143)   (0.0150)  (0.0147)  (0.0156)  
Country dummies 
(*j)?  Y     Y     Y     Y    
Time trends (*j)?  Y   Y  Y  Y  
Country-time trends 
(*j)?  N     Y     N     Y    
 
Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are shown. Pooled data for 14 countries, 
5 periods. Sample size is 295,254. The analysis includes all women aged 18 to 45. Three 
asterisks indicate significance at the 99% confidence level, two indicate significance at the 95% 
confidence level, and one indicates a 90% confidence level. Specifications 1 and 2 use a 
measure of expected wages calculated using data for all women (by country, year, education and 
age), while columns 3 and 4 show the results when using an alternative measure of wages 










Table 5. Marginal Effects from Conditional Logit  
  
Never 
Married M.    
Divorced 
Mothers    
All Single 
Mothers    
Female wage ($/hour)  -0.144  *** -0.100  *  -0.244  *** 
 
(0.0069)   (0.0535)   (0.0540)  
Benefits single 
mothers  0.625 *** 0.092  *** 0.717 *** 
($1000/year) (0.0724)    (0.0178)    (0.0745) 
 
Benefits all families 
with children  0.365  *** 0.848  *** 1.213  *** 
($1000/year) (0.0774)    (0.0743)    (0.1073) 
 
Male earnings  -0.061  *** 0.058  *** -0.003  . 
($1000/year) (0.0040)    (0.0036)    (0.0054) 
 
Male employment  -1.779  *** 1.640  *** -0.139  . 
 
(0.1305)   (0.1163)   (0.1748) 
 
Alimony/child support  -0.009  *** 0.028  *** 0.018  *** 
($1000/year) (0.0007)    (0.0020)    (0.0021) 
  
 
Note: Average derivatives and standard errors (in parentheses) are shown. Pooled data for 14 
countries, 5 periods. Sample size is 295,254. The analysis includes all women aged 18 to 45. 
Three asterisks indicate significance at the 99% confidence level, two indicate significance at 
the 95% confidence level, and one indicates a 90% confidence level. The specification includes 







                                                 
 